We’re excited to announce that the AREUEA Virtual Seminar Series is back! 

Please join us for the first seminar of Spring 2026:

Speaker: Santosh Anagol (Wharton)

Paper Title: Optimal Tax Policy with Misreporting: Theory, and Evidence from Real Estate (joint with Vimal Balasubramaniam, Ben Lockwood, Tarun Ramadorai and Antoine Uettwiller)

Date: Wednesday 4th/Feb/2026 at 9:00 AM Eastern Time

Abstract: We develop a model of optimal taxation and enforcement when policymakers seek both welfare maximization and “tax accuracy,” where taxpayers remit the amount statutorily owed under truthful reporting; and characterize the optimal combination of tax rate and enforcement stringency. We apply the framework to the Mumbai real-estate market, a setting with widespread misreporting and a transparent enforcement instrument: government-specified guidance values set the minimum required tax base. Bunching evidence plus third party estimates of market values suggest under-reporting relative to market values, consistent with the government setting low guidance values to avoid the problem of overpayments. Structural estimates based on the observed level of guidance values suggest the government is willing to give up Rs. 2.12 in tax revenue to avoid charging taxpayers Rs. 1 more than their statutory liability.

Registration: https://us06web.zoom.us/webinar/register/WN_CqSh75RzQO2GByUUhqnFKA